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Cache-Timing Attacks and Shared Contexts

Research output: Other conference contributionPaper, poster or abstractScientific

Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages233-242
Number of pages10
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2011
Externally publishedYes
EventCOSADE 2011: Second International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - Darmstadt, Germany
Duration: 24 Feb 201125 Feb 2011
Conference number: 2
http://cosade2011.cased.de/index.html

Workshop

WorkshopCOSADE 2011
Abbreviated titleCOSADE 2011
CountryGermany
CityDarmstadt
Period24/02/1125/02/11
Internet address

Abstract

Cache-timing attacks recover algorithm state by exploiting the fact that the latency of retrieving data from memory is essentially governed by the availability of said data in the processor’s cache. Efficient and effective countermeasures to these attacks are needed. A shared memory context is a mechanism for reusing dynamically allocated memory. Focusing on public key cryptography within OpenSSL and its implementation of shared contexts, this paper examines the ability of a shared context to aid in mitigation of cache-timing attacks. The results are pessimistic towards this approach.

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