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Evolutionary dynamics of the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma with self-inhibition

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Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)6482-6488
Number of pages7
JournalApplied Mathematics and Computation
Volume218
Issue number11
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 5 Feb 2012
Publication typeA1 Journal article-refereed

Abstract

In this paper we study the influence of interventions on self-interactions in a spatial Prisoner's Dilemma on a two-dimensional grid with periodic boundary conditions and synchronous updating of the dynamics. We investigate two different types of self-interaction modifications. The first type (FSIP) is deterministic, effecting each self-interaction of a player by a constant factor, whereas the second type (PSIP) performs a probabilistic interventions. Both types of interventions lead to a reduction of the payoff of the players and, hence, represent inhibiting effects. We find that a constant but moderate reduction of self-interactions has a very beneficial effect on the evolution of cooperators in the population, whereas probabilistic interventions on self-interactions are in general counter productive for the coexistence of the two different strategies.

Keywords

  • Evolutionary dynamics, Evolutionary game theory, Game theory, Prisoner's dilemma