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"Make Sure DSA Signing Exponentiations Really are Constant-Time"

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionScientificpeer-review

Details

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Vienna, Austria, October 24-28, 2016
EditorsEdgar R. Weippl, Stefan Katzenbeisser, Christopher Kruegel, Andrew C. Myers, Shai Halevi
PublisherACM
Pages1639-1650
Number of pages12
ISBN (Print)978-1-4503-4139-4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016
Publication typeA4 Article in a conference publication
EventACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY -
Duration: 1 Jan 1900 → …

Conference

ConferenceACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY
Period1/01/00 → …

Abstract

TLS and SSH are two of the most commonly used protocols for securing Internet traffic. Many of the implementations of these protocols rely on the cryptographic primitives provided in the OpenSSL library. In this work we disclose a vulnerability in OpenSSL, affecting all versions and forks (e.g. LibreSSL and BoringSSL) since roughly October 2005, which renders the implementation of the DSA signature scheme vulnerable to cache-based side-channel attacks. Exploiting the software defect, we demonstrate the first published cache-based key-recovery attack on these protocols: 260 SSH-2 handshakes to extract a 1024/160-bit DSA host key from an OpenSSH server, and 580 TLS 1.2 handshakes to extract a 2048/256-bit DSA key from an stunnel server.

Publication forum classification

Field of science, Statistics Finland

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