TUTCRIS - Tampereen teknillinen yliopisto

TUTCRIS

Port Contention for Fun and Profit

Tutkimustuotosvertaisarvioitu

Yksityiskohdat

AlkuperäiskieliEnglanti
Otsikko2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) (2019)
JulkaisupaikkaSan Francisco, CA, US
KustantajaIEEE
Sivut1037-1054
Sivumäärä18
ISBN (elektroninen)978-1-5386-6660-9
DOI - pysyväislinkit
TilaJulkaistu - 20 toukokuuta 2019
OKM-julkaisutyyppiA4 Artikkeli konferenssijulkaisussa
TapahtumaIEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy - San Francisco, Yhdysvallat
Kesto: 19 toukokuuta 201923 toukokuuta 2019

Julkaisusarja

Nimi
ISSN (painettu)1081-6011

Conference

ConferenceIEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
MaaYhdysvallat
KaupunkiSan Francisco
Ajanjakso19/05/1923/05/19

Tiivistelmä

Simultaneous Multithreading (SMT) architectures are attractive targets for side-channel enabled attackers, with their inherently broader attack surface that exposes more per physical core microarchitecture components than cross-core attacks. In this work, we explore SMT execution engine sharing as a side-channel leakage source. We target ports to stacks of execution units to create a high-resolution timing side-channel due to port contention, inherently stealthy since it does not depend on the memory subsystem like other cache or TLB based attacks. Implementing our channel on Intel Skylake and Kaby Lake architectures featuring Hyper-Threading, we mount an end-to-end attack that recovers a P-384 private key from an OpenSSL-powered TLS server using a small number of repeated TLS handshake attempts. Furthermore, we show that traces targeting shared libraries, static builds, and SGX enclaves are essentially identical, hence our channel has wide target application.

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