TUTCRIS - Tampereen teknillinen yliopisto

TUTCRIS

Remote timing attacks are still practical

Tutkimustuotosvertaisarvioitu

Yksityiskohdat

AlkuperäiskieliEnglanti
OtsikkoComputer Security, ESORICS 2011 - 16th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Proceedings
Sivut355-371
Sivumäärä17
Vuosikerta6879 LNCS
DOI - pysyväislinkit
TilaJulkaistu - 2011
OKM-julkaisutyyppiA4 Artikkeli konferenssijulkaisussa
Tapahtuma16th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, ESORICS 2011 - Leuven, Belgia
Kesto: 12 syyskuuta 201114 syyskuuta 2011

Julkaisusarja

NimiLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Vuosikerta6879 LNCS
ISSN (painettu)03029743
ISSN (elektroninen)16113349

Conference

Conference16th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, ESORICS 2011
MaaBelgia
KaupunkiLeuven
Ajanjakso12/09/1114/09/11

Tiivistelmä

For over two decades, timing attacks have been an active area of research within applied cryptography. These attacks exploit cryptosystem or protocol implementations that do not run in constant time. When implementing an elliptic curve cryptosystem with a goal to provide side-channel resistance, the scalar multiplication routine is a critical component. In such instances, one attractive method often suggested in the literature is Montgomery's ladder that performs a fixed sequence of curve and field operations. This paper describes a timing attack vulnerability in OpenSSL's ladder implementation for curves over binary fields. We use this vulnerability to steal the private key of a TLS server where the server authenticates with ECDSA signatures. Using the timing of the exchanged messages, the messages themselves, and the signatures, we mount a lattice attack that recovers the private key. Finally, we describe and implement an effective countermeasure.

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